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Epistemology of Textual Re-use in the *Nyāyamañjarī*

Alessandro Graheli

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Abstract The epistemology of *śabda* is one of the main themes in Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's *Nyāyamañjarī*, and, in the hypotheses explored in this paper, also the conceptual basis of Jayanta's textual re-use. The sixth chapter of the *Nyāyamañjarī* contains a debate between Vaiyākaraṇas and Mīmāṃsakas who, respectively, advocated an holistic or atomistic theory of language. Selected Jayanta's re-uses from Vyākaraṇa, Mīmāṃsā, and Nyāya sources are here surveyed and analyzed, with a focus on their meaning and on the context. The method of analysis is partially following Moravcsik's scheme for a classification of citations, as well as Small's classification by symbolic functions. By re-using texts Jayanta not only imparted authority to his own arguments, but also reassessed the relation of his tradition with other ones. Re-used ideas and words stand for symbols of those authors' tenets, and those authors represent symbols of their respective traditions. Moreover, by quoting a certain author Jayanta often anointed him with a symbolic status of trustworthy authority, and his statement with a status of *śabdapramāṇa*.

Keywords Jayanta · *Nyāyamañjarī* · Citations · Textual re-use · Verbal testimony · *Śabda*

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A. Graheli (✉)
Department of South Asian, Tibetan and Buddhist Studies, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria
e-mail: alessandro.graheli@univie.ac.at

1 Introduction

1.1 Bhaṭṭa Jayanta and the *Nyāyamañjarī* (NM)

The *Nyāyamañjarī* (henceforth NM) is a treatise on the tenets of Nyāya, the system of epistemology, dialectics and logic traditionally rooted in the *Nyāyasūtra* (NS). It was written by Bhaṭṭa Jayanta in the ninth century CE.[1]

The NM is composed of 12 chapters. In NM 3 to 6, about one third of the whole work, Jayanta examines in depth the epistemology of *śabda* (on this term, see Sect. 2). The present paper is grounded on a survey of a selection of re-use of texts in the *sphoṭa* section of NM 6. By "re-use" I mean the adoption of previously existing textual passages and ideas, as a general and widely encompassing term. *Verbatim* re-use will be here called "quotation", in cases where I am confident that Jayanta is consciously quoting existing texts.

This particular section of the NM consists of an investigation on the aetiology of *śabda*-produced knowledge, in which Jayanta stages a debate among Vyākaraṇa and Mīmāṃsā schools. There are three main reasons behind the choice of this particular section: first, my critical edition of this portion, based on all the available manuscripts,[2] is at an advanced stage, so its text is for the purposes of this paper more reliable than that of other parts of the NM; secondly, with a well structured sequence of arguments and counter-arguments, such as that of this section of the NM, it is easier to assess the function of textual re-use in Jayanta's system; thirdly, in the course of the editing process, I had already identified a significant amount of re-used passages and their sources, which allows me to invest time and energy in evaluating re-uses, rather than in tracing them.

1.2 Truth-Values, Epistemic Function, and Symbolic Effect of Re-used Texts

In the analysis and classification I will mostly focus on the quality and the context of re-uses. Following in part the scheme for a classification of citations devised by Moravcsik and Poovanalingam (1975) and the classification by symbolic functions, introduced by Small (1978), I will classify re-uses in the NM by asking the following questions about Jayanta's intentions:

(1) Truth value: Is the re-use confirmatory or negational? In other words, did Jayanta consider the re-used passage true or false?
(2) Symbolic value: Which tradition, author, or idea does the re-used text stand for?

Moravcsik and Poovanalingam (1975, p. 88) envision four dichotomies in their scheme: (1) conceptual/operational, (2) organic/perfunctory, (3) evolutionary/juxtapositional, (4) confirmatory/negational. Of these four, (1) is ignored here,

[1] For evidence about the date and other biographic information on Bhaṭṭa Jayanta, also known as Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, see Slaje (1986, p. 245 ff.), Potter (1995, pp. 345–346), Dezső (2005, Introduction), Kataoka (2007), Slaje (2012).

[2] For a list and description of extant NM manuscripts, see Graheli (2012a).

since it is specific to the natural sciences. (2) and (3) would both be relevant, but for want of space they will need to be addressed elsewhere. (4) is here discussed and implemented in terms of truth-value.

As for the symbolic function, it was introduced by Small (1978, p. 328):

> [Previous] studies have missed the role citations play as symbols of concepts or methods. This cognitive function arises from the formal requirement imposed on the scientist-author of embedding his references to earlier literature in a written text. This leads to the citing of works which embody ideas the author is discussing. The cited documents become, then, in a more general sense, 'symbols' for these ideas.
>
> […] In the tradition of scholarship, the references are the 'sources' which the author draws upon to give further meaning to his text. Reversing this view, as I am suggesting here, the author is imparting meaning to his 'sources' by citing them.
>
> […] In general, [by 'symbolic'] I mean that an object 'stands for' an idea; for citations, the cited document is the 'object' and the 'idea' is expressed in the text which cites it.

When applied to the re-use of texts in the NM, the term "symbolic" can encompass at least three different levels, the first two intended by the author, the third probably accidental:[3]

- By re-using texts, Jayanta not only imparted authority to his own arguments, but also reassessed the relation of his tradition with other ones. Re-used ideas and words stand for symbols of those authors' tenets, and those authors represent symbols of their respective traditions.
- By quoting a certain author Jayanta may intend to assign him a symbolic status of trustworthy authority (*āpta*), and to his statement a status of *śabdapramāṇa*.
- By arranging textual passages in a new order (see Sect. 4), Jayanta endowed them with new meanings.

While analyzing the context and the structure of re-uses, I will therefore try to identify the tradition, author, and concept symbolized by the cited text.

1.3 Contents of this Paper

The epistemology of *śabda* is not only the subject matter of NM 6, but also, in the hypotheses explored in this paper, the conceptual basis of Jayanta's re-use of sources. Therefore, in Sect. 2 a brief sketch of the epistemology of *śabda* is provided.

In the *sphoṭa* section of NM 6 Jayanta hardly ever re-uses material from his own tradition. The reasons behind this absence of Nyāya sources are explored in Sect. 3.

[3] A concise yet exhaustive survey on the use of the term "symbol" can be found in Eco (1996, pp. 199–225). Symbols as "linguistic signs which are conventional and arbitrary" (see pp. 210–211), according to Eco already used by Aristotle in a similar sense, seem particularly relevant in the present application of the NM.

Further clues about Jayanta's attitude in relation to his own tradition can be derived from some introductory verses of the NM. The most relevant passages are examined in Sect. 4.

Section 5 is a synopsis of the structure of *sphoṭa* section of NM 6, needed to facilitate the comprehension of my analysis of the style and the epistemic value of re-uses. Arguments for and against the *sphoṭa* theory are staged as an articulate dialog between Vaiyākaraṇas and Mīmāṃsakas. Accordingly, in Sects. 7 and 8, textual re-uses in the whole *sphoṭa* section are surveyed in two distinct parts.

For a more exhaustive assessment of Jayanta's modality of re-use, I decided to compare his treatment of Mīmāṃsā and Vyākaraṇa sources with that of Nyāya ones, and since Nyāya sources are almost absent in NM 6, in Sect. 9 some NS and NBh re-uses from other parts of the NM are also examined.

2 The Epistemology of *śabda*

In Nyāya an authoritative instance of *śabda* must come from a source that satisfies the criteria of trustworthiness. If textual re-use has epistemic purposes, therefore, clarity about the identification of the source and its authoritativeness becomes particularly relevant. The formal style of a quotation, moreover, may reflect an appreciation or criticism of the source, in conformity with the assessment of a given quotation as representing an accepted truth or a false tenet. To contextualize the survey of quotations in the NM, some basic notions related to *śabda* epistemology are discussed next.

2.1 Comprehension, Knowledge, and Their Object

In most cases I will leave untranslated the terms *śabda* and *artha*, in want of English equivalents that can give justice to their technical and polysemous usages. Also, the two terms are not always treated homogeneously in Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā and Vyākaraṇa. As a general orientation, in the present context *śabda* is to be understood as "epistemic linguistic expression", i.e., "linguistic expression having the purpose of conveying knowledge", and its *artha* as "object of epistemic linguistic expression". Although *śabda* is often rendered with "word" or, at best, "linguistic expression", and *artha* with "meaning", such equivalents fail to convey the epistemic import of these terms.

In the use of Sanskrit expressions such as *śabdabodha, śabdārthapratīti, śabdārthasampratyaya, padārthapratipatti, vākyārthapratipatti*, etc., the distinction between *understanding* words and *knowing* from words is not explicit and is philosophically problematic. As noted by Matilal and Chakrabarti (1994, Introduction, pp. 9–11), in Nyāya literature the implied assumption is that verbal knowledge (*śabdabodha*) is "knowledge derived from the words of a truth-teller", rather than "understanding of words", although in English translations a tendency to render *śabda* and *artha* in the latter context seems prevalent.

The conflation of "comprehension *of* words" and "knowledge *from* words" that we witness in Sanskrit literature, however, may not necessarily be a philosophical flaw, if we consider how comprehension is a fundamental and inextricable part of word-derived knowledge.[4]

2.2 *Śabda* in Nyāya

In NBh ad 1.1.7, *śabda* as an instrument of knowledge is defined as follows:

> *śabda* is the instruction (*upadeśa*) of a trustworthy instructor. It is of two kinds, since it can have either a perceivable or an imperceivable *artha*.
> *āptopadeśaḥ śabdaḥ // sa dvividho dṛṣṭādṛṣṭārthatvāt //*

The trustworthiness of the source concerns language in general, so that it is considered the ground for the validity of both common and Vedic language. Unlike in Mīmāṃsā, in Nyāya the authority of the Veda is also founded on the trustworthiness of their source:

> And that [Veda] is a valid source of knowledge because its trustworthy instructor is a valid source.
> […] *tatprāmāṇyam āptaprāmāṇyāt //*

A trustworthy instructor is defined as follows:

> Trustworthy is the instructor (*upadeṣṭṛ*) who has directly experienced the essential property (*dharma*) [of things], and is moved by the desire to describe [things] as they are or they are not.
> *āptaḥ khalu sākṣātkṛtadharmā yathādṛṣṭasyādṛṣṭasya cikhyāpayiṣayā prayukta upadeṣṭā /*

Being grounded on the utterance of a trustworthy instructor, *śabda* can by no means be considered permanent (*nitya*) by the Naiyāyikas, since such an utterance must have occurred at some point in time. Moreover, the relation between *śabda* and *artha* is considered conventional, rather than natural, because it is based on stipulations (*saṅketa*) established by divine or human beings (NBh ad 2.1.55–56).

2.3 Differences in Mīmāṃsā and Vyākaraṇa

In Mīmāṃsā, *śabda* is accepted *ipso facto* as natural and unalterable (*Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.1.5, see ŚBh, p. 28), so issues related to its development or aetiology are deliberately ignored as pointless. The possibility of an author is irrelevant for its

[4] The Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā traditions are counted by Julie Jack (1994) among exponents of what she labels "Uniqueness School", according to which there is a "uniqueness of knowing from words as a form of knowledge,—its irreducibility either to perception or to inference […]" (1994, p. 165). In her essay she also explores the problematic overlap of comprehension, judgment, and rational belief in verbal testimony.

validity as an instrument of knowledge (which in Mīmāṃsā is, specifically, knowledge of *dharma*) and for its reality, i.e. its relation with a (mental or concrete) object. The fixedness (*nityatā*) of such a relation necessarily implies the permanence of *śabda*: the idea that *śabda* is ephemeral, common to most opponents of Mīmāṃsā, is rejected in *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.1.18:

> [*śabda*] must be permanent (*nitya*) [in relation to its *artha*], because [its] appearance is for the purpose of [communicating with] someone else.
> *nityas tu syād darśanasya parārthatvāt //*

If *śabda* were ephemeral, how could there be a continuous and consistent inter-subjectivity of speakers and hearers, who comprehend a same expression in the same way? To account for the sheer phenomenon of communication, the relation of a *śabda* with an *artha* must be understood as stable and permanent.

In Bhartṛhari's philosophy of grammar, the ultimate reality (*paramārtha*) is a non-dual *śabdatattva*, while all dualities and differences, including the distinction into *śabda* and *artha*, appear as such only on the relative level of worldly interactions (*vyavahāra*), and not in an absolute, real sense (see VP, 1.1).

Moreover, since the ultimate reality is *śabda*, true knowledge must be grounded in it (VP, 1.131):

> In this world there is no cognition without the comprehension of *śabda*. Every knowledge shines as if penetrated by *śabda*.
> *na so 'sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamād ṛte /*
> *anuviddham iva jñānaṃ sarvaṃ śabdena bhāsate //*

Jayanta sums up Bhartṛhari's philosophy of *śabda* as follows (NM^{Va} II, pp. 156,19–157,1):

> The non-dual Absolute, *śabda*, whose apparent differences are caused by traces of a beginning-less nescience, is deceptively perceived as if related to the *artha*. There is actually no signified thing separated from the signifier. Therefore, this signified-signifier (*vācyavācaka*) subdivision, which is merely theoretical, is nothing but nescience used as a tool to achieve awareness (*vidyā*).

The non-dual reality is *śabda*, so in Bhartṛhari's perspective Nyāya concepts such as "trustworthy instructor" and "conventional meaning" are fictional ones. Also the *śabda-artha* dichotomy is imaginary, since such duality does not exist in reality. The segmentation of language into sentences, words, and phonemes is an artificial operation, certainly useful for didactic purposes, but ultimately unreal.

2.4 The Oral and Written *śabda*

Traditionally, in India, *śabda* typically pertains to the realm of orality, while present analyses of textual re-use mostly concern written literature.[5] It is debatable to what

[5] The distinction between the oral and written nature of *śabda* is not always made, e.g. in Saksena (1951, pp. 38, 46), who interprets *śabda* as "verbal or written authority" or "verbal or written testimony". Bhattacharyya (1994, p. 76) points to an important difference, relevant to the context of the NM, between spoken and written expressions: "Whether what is spoken endures when speaking is over is debatable;

extent Jayanta used written sources or, rather, had them committed to memory when he wrote the NM.

We also do not know how works such as the NS or the NBh were originally composed and, if orally composed, when they began to be preserved and transmitted in written form. However, judging from the epistemic importance of *śabda* and from teaching and learning habits in traditional circles witnessed in modern times, it is possible that the performative tradition of these works was mainly oral, and that they were often memorized and taught without much reliance on writing.[6] For easily memorizable works, such as those in aphorisms and verses, the written record was probably perceived as secondary. In other words, the authority of orally taught truths, passed on from teacher to pupil, was probably superior to that of written ones.

As for large and digressive works such as the NM, they were more likely composed in written form to begin with and were not commonly meant to be memorized in their entirety. If this is the case, then, also the purpose of their written transmission must have been different. In 1472 CE, Śitikaṇṭhācārya Svāmin, the learned copyist of the oldest extant NM manuscript, wrote in his colophon (P, fol. II 271r,1) that the NM had been copied by him for teaching purposes (*śiṣyān adhyāpayitum*).

In any case, what is the epistemic role of written words for Jayanta? During his refutation of the *sphoṭa*, he makes clear that written letters convey knowledge of the *artha* indirectly, through an inferential process:

> […] Therefore the knowledge of the *artha* caused by the ink traits is based on the inference of the phonemes (*tasmād varṇānumānapurassaraiva rekhābhyo 'rthāvagatiḥ*).

It thus seems theoretically acceptable to consider writing as leading to an instance of epistemically effective *śabda*. Just like the perception of phonemes assists the hearer in knowing from *śabda*, so can the perception of the ink traits assist an inference of those very phonemes, which again assists the hearer in knowing from *śabda*. One should also keep in mind that in Nyāya epistemology the possibility of knowing one and the same object through different instruments of knowledge (*pramāṇasamplava*) is acceptable (NM^{Va} I, pp. 87–93). Furthermore, loud reading of a written source, either by the teacher to the pupils or on one's own, may also play a role in these considerations.

3 Why did Jayanta Use Mīmāṃsā Sources?

Before Jayanta, in Nyāya sources, there had been no focus on the sentence, with linguistic analyses mostly concerned with words and their link to external things. In NM 5 (NM^{Va} II, pp. 135,15–136,10), after examining various theories on sentence

Footnote 5 continued
what is written survives the act of writing. So all written words exist side by side […]". Mohanty (1994, p. 31) suggests slight modifications in the utterer-conditions to make room for written testimony as *śabda*.

6 This, incidentally, would also explain the absence of a manuscript tradition of the NS independent of the NBh in the early stage of the transmission.

signification, Jayanta explained why he could not fully count on his own tradition on this matter, and, implicitly, why he largely drew from Mīmāṃsā theories:

> [Objection:] The authors of the [*Nyāya*]*sūtra* and of the [*Nyāya*]*bhāṣya* have not described the *artha* of the sentence anywhere: from where shall we learn about the nature of the *artha* of the sentence, in order to expound it? [Counter-objection:] […] this discipline of reasoning (*ānvīkṣikī*) is the science of means of knowledge, not the science of the *artha* of the sentence.
>
> [Objection:] Yet, if such is the case, why was the *artha* of the word taught, [by the *sūtra*] "the *artha* of the word, however, is the individual thing, [its] conformation (*ākṛti*), [its] universal character (*jāti*)" [NS 2.2.66]? [Counter-objection:] This is a good point. That effort, however, was done by the author of the [*Nyāya*]*sūtra* in order to establish the epistemic validity of *śabda*, and to calm down protests that there is no contact between *śabda* and *artha*.
>
> [Objection:] Yet, if this is the case, without an external object as the *artha* of the sentence the epistemic foundation of the science would remain shaky, so an effort should be done also in this area. [Counter-objection:] True. The author of the [*Nyāya*]*sūtra*, by teaching only the *artha* of the word, meant to take care [also] of that [*artha* of the sentence], so he did not teach the *artha* of the sentence separately from that of the word. Therefore, his idea is that the very *artha* of the word is the *artha* of the sentence; […] not that the *artha* of a single word is the *artha* of the sentence; rather, the *artha* of several words is the *artha* of the sentence.

In this passage, Jayanta stressed the epistemic focus of the Nyāya discipline. Also, he apparently endorsed a realist epistemology in which the *artha* is external and real (*bāhya* and *vāstava*). Lastly, he hinted at the strategy that he was going to adopt to explain the transaction from word to sentence signification, on the one hand respecting the letter of the NS (2.2.66), were the *artha* of the word is defined, and on the other integrating a modified version of the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā theory of sentence signification in the Nyāya system.[7]

4 Jayanta on Re-use and Originality

In the introductory verses of the NM (NM^{Va} I, pp. 2–4), there are further indications about Jayanta's relation with his own tradition, a source of many of his re-uses. In verse 4 he traced back the Nyāya tradition to sage Akṣapāda, to whom the NS is attributed, and in verses 7–9 he portrayed the tradition of Nyāya as the source of his tenets, claiming for himself only the merit of having craftily re-ordered pre-existing notions:[8]

[7] On the rival Mīmāṃsā theories of *abhihitānvaya* and *anvitābhidhāna*, and on Jayanta's understanding of these, see Kunjunni Raja (1963, p. 215) and Graheli (forthcoming).

[8] Besides Jayanta, other well-known authors, such as Abhinavagupta, have portrayed themselves as mere re-arrangers of traditional tenets. This typical self-description by three heterogeneous authors such as Jayanta, Abhinavagupta, and Jīva Gosvāmin, is compared and related to the issue of novelty and repetition in Graheli (2008).

> This superior essence was collected in the forests of the herbs of Nyāya. It was extracted like butter from the milk of reasoning (*ānvīkṣikī*).[9] How could I be capable of even envisioning a new topic? Here my only concern is a variety (*vaicitrya*) in arrangement of the [traditional] statements. Flower chaplets crafted in the past can generate new interest if their very flowers are recomposed on a new string.

After comparing the Nyāya system to a mighty tree cared for by Akṣapāda, Jayanta depicted himself as merely capable of a partial view of its full richness:

> In fact, the tall tree of logic laid down by Akṣapāda bears a load of fruits oozing thick nectar. I will gently shake it, being uncapable of climbing on it. [Thus] I cannot even see its full burden of riches.

To sum up, Jayanta planned his NM as a new structure built with tenets of a rich pre-existing tradition, without any claim for originality, except for the arrangement of the presentation.

5 The Argumentative Structure of the *sphoṭa* Section of NM 6

To examine the formal aspect of quotations and other re-uses, and to assess their epistemic value, the context of the argumentative structure is crucial. The *sphoṭa* section of NM 6 can be segmented in five argumentative steps: problem, thesis, first antithesis, second antithesis, synthesis (sketched in Fig. 1).

- The topic is introduced by the philosophical problem (*saṃśaya*) that is going to be dissected and settled: in the epistemic process of knowing something upon hearing a linguistic expression, what is precisely the cause of knowledge of an *artha*? Is it the ephemeral phonemes, as claimed in Nyāya (*pratijñā*, thesis)? Or is it the indivisible entity called *sphoṭa*, as claimed in Vyākaraṇa (*pūrvapakṣa*, first antithesis)? Or is it the permanent phonemes, as claimed in Mīmāṃsā (*uttarapakṣa*, second antithesis)?
- The thesis is that phonemes are heard in sequence form words and sentences, and thus they collectively cause knowledge of an object, though phonemes are not permanent entities, but rather ephemeral ones.
- The first antithesis (*pūrvapakṣa*) is the solution of the problem as proposed in Vyākaraṇa, based on Bhartṛhari's holistic theory of meaning.
- The second antithesis (*uttarapakṣa*), which refutes the first one, is the solution of the problem as proposed in Mīmāṃsā, largely based on Kumārila's atomistic arguments.[10]
- The synthesis (*siddhānta*) consists of a minor modification of the Mīmāṃsā arguments, to suit the Nyāya needs.

[9] On the evolution from Ānvīkṣikī to Nyāya, see Preisendanz (2009).

[10] "Atomism" and "holism" are here used as relative terms: Kumārila has an atomistic perspective in relation to Bhartṛhari, but Nyāya views before Jayanta could be considered more atomist than Kumārila's. On the use of the terms "holism" and "atomism" in relation to the context and composition principles and to the Indian theories of meaning, see Matilal and Sen (1988, p. 84).




Fig. 1 Argumentative structure of the *sphoṭa* section of NM 6

The thesis and the two antitheses are in turn structured in a dialogic form of progressive objections (*pakṣa*), counter-objections (*pratipakṣa*), and verdicts (*nirṇaya*), so that in the first antithesis the objections and the verdicts are Bhartṛhari's, while the counter-objections are (mainly) Kumārila's; in the second antithesis the roles are reversed. The problem, the thesis, and the synthesis are presented very concisely, while the two antitheses form the bulk of the section.

6 Re-uses in the NM

In the following, a selection of re-uses in defense and refutation of the *sphoṭa* are documented in tabular form. For pragmatic reasons, I limited myself to re-uses of the *Śābarabhāṣya* (ŚBh), *Ślokavārttika* (ŚV), *Ślokavārttikatātparyaṭīkā* (ŚVTṬ),[11] and *Vākyapadīya* (VP). I ignored other sources such as the *Bṛhatī* (Bṛh) and the

[11] The debt of Jayanta to Uṃveka's commentary is clear from many passages (see Sects. 7.1, 7.3, 7.6, 8.1, and 8.2 below). In a number of occasions (GBh, pp. 24,14, 149,4, 182,17), Jayanta's commentator, Cakradhara, also noticed the connection and explicitly mentioned Jayanta's references to Uṃveka.

Sphoṭasiddhi (SphS).[12] The list of re-uses presented here is a selection without claims of exhaustiveness, as there are less evident re-uses which were discarded, and other possible ones that may have escaped my attention.

Re-uses are sorted according to their sequence of occurrence in the NM and are grouped in tables on the basis of the argumentative structure of the NM. Each table is contextualized by a brief synopsis of the philosophical issues at stake, and followed by some comments on the interesting features of the re-uses.

The first column contains the origin of the text re-used by Jayanta, with the reading of the most reliable edition available to me (NS, NBh, ŚV^{Ra}, ŚVTṬ, VP; for quotations from parts of the ŚV not covered by ŚV^{Ra}, I used ŚV^{Dvā} instead); manuscript research on these sources, although important for a conclusive assessment, was not feasible at this stage. The second indicates the truth value (True/False) from the source viewpoint. The third, fourth and fifth columns contain the re-use as found in the NM, sub-classified into three segments: the re-use (sequentially numbered for cross-reference purpose in this paper) preceded or followed by pre- and post-quote markers, when present; re-used expressions, including also differently inflected stems, are shown in bold face. Lastly, the sixth and the seventh columns indicate the truth value from the point of view of the symbolic speaker, and the tradition symbolized by the statement (Vyākaraṇa/Mīmāṃsā/Nyāya).

All the NM passages reproduced in this paper refer to the pagination of NM^{Va}. Whenever other relevant witnesses[13]—namely NM^{Ga}, the *Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga* (GBh) and the important manuscripts (P and C)—have substantive variants that differ from NM^{Va}, such readings are either received in the text or shown in critical notes below the tables.

7 First Antithesis: Re-use in Defense of the *sphoṭa*

7.1 Phonemes do not Cause Verbal Knowledge

Vaiyākaraṇas maintain that phonemes cannot convey meaning, neither independently nor collectively. Independent phonemes are just meaningless parts of words. And if a word is considered a collection of phonemes, one must explain if they function simultaneously or in sequence, and both options are not tenable.

The simultaneous existence of phonemes is ruled out in (1). The only possibility of a simultaneous utterance of the phonemes composing a word would be that each

[12] Although in the NM there are no explicit references to Maṇḍana or to the SphS, there are some instances that suggest some relation. The most striking one is the argument in NM^{Va}, 150,13–14, where *eke*, contrasted to *apare*, i.e. to Bhartṛhari, may refer to Maṇḍana Miśra. The SphS, 89,4–6 reads: *yathā ratnaparīkṣiṇaḥ parīkṣamāṇasya prathamasamadhigamānupākhyātam anupākhyeyarūpapratyayopāhitasaṃskārarūpāhitaviśeṣāyāṃ buddhau krameṇa carame cetasi cakāsti ratnatattvam*. The NM reads: *yathā ratnaparīkṣakāṇāṃ prathamadarśane ratnarūpam amalam prakāśamānam api punaḥ punaḥ parīkṣamāṇānāṃ carame cetasi cakāsti niravadyaṃ ratnatattvam*. The terminological similarity is noteworthy. I could not find this jem/jeweller comparison in early sources, except for Vācaspati Miśra's *Tattvabindu* (see TB, p. 70), for which there are arguments in favor of its posteriority in respect to the NM.

[13] A detailed explanation of the criteria for selecting relevant NM witnesses is provided in Graheli 2012b.

of a group of speakers simultaneously utters one of the phonemes composing the word, which is absurd (2). So, since a plurality of phonemes is uttered by a single speaker, there must necessarily be a chronological sequence of phonemes in such an utterance (3) (Table 7.1).

In (1), the link with Kumārila's statement is more evident in the variant of P, with the reading *sattā*, in place of *satām* of the NM editions. For both opponents, as well as for Jayanta, (1) denies the possibility of the simultaneous existence of the phonemes forming a word. Although because of different reasons, for all of them it is true that by itself a group of phonemes can not cause verbal knowledge. For Mīmāṃsakas *śabda* is permanent and thus an ontological simultaneity of phonemes is acceptable, but phonemes need to be uttered and grasped in order to be effective, and they are uttered and grasped in sequence. Also for Vaiyākaraṇas *śabda* is permanent, but an ontological simultaneity of phonemes is impossible because phonemes are ultimately fictional entities. For Naiyāyikas a simultaneous existence of phonemes is simply not possible, due to the ephemeral nature of *śabda*.

In (2) the absurdity of many people simultaneously pronouncing different phonemes of a same word is stated, and this is obviously shared by all. (3) is also true for everyone involved here, because if a single person utters a series of phonemes there must necessarily be a sequence.

Table 7.1 The theory of phonemes is wrong

Source	Truth val.	Pre-quote	Re-use	Post-quote	Truth val.	Point of view
yaugapadyāgṛhīteś ca samudāyau na sidhyataḥ / na sattāyaugapadyasya vyavahārāṅgateṣyate // (ŚV[Dvā], vākya 7cd–8ab)	True		(1) na cakṣurādīnām iva varṇānāṃ kārakatvam, yenā**gṛhītānām** eva **sattā**[a] **yaugapadya**-mātram arthapratyā-yanāṅgaṃ syāt / etad apy aghāṭamānam (NM[Va] II, p. 145,6–7)		True	Vyā.
yaugapadyaṃ ca śakyatvān naiva teṣām ihāśritam / kartṛbhedaś ca tatra syān na caivaṃ dṛśyate 'bhidhā // (ŚV[Ra], *sphoṭa* 72)	True		(2) tatrāneka[b]puruṣabhā-ṣitānāṃ kolāhala-svabhāvatvena svarūpabheda eva duravagama (NM[Va] II, p. 145,12–13)		True	Vyā.
vaktraikatve nimitte ca krame sati niyāmakam / prayuñjānasya yat pūrvaṃ vṛddhebhyaḥ kramadarśanam; vaktur ekatvāc ca varṇānām avaśyaṃbhāvini krame […] (ŚV[Ra], *sphoṭa* 71; ŚVTṬ, *sphoṭa* 71)	True		(3) **ekavaktṛpra-yuktānāṃ** tu prayatnasthānakaraṇa-kramāparityāgād **avaśyambhāvī kramaḥ** / NM[Va] II, p. 145,16–17		True	Vyā.

[a] sattā] P; satāṃ NM[Ga] NM[Va]; sato C • [b] tatrāneka] P C NM[Ga]; tatra ekadāneka NM[Va]

7.2 The Last Phoneme does not Cause Knowledge

Conceding that phonemes do not convey meaning, neither independently nor collectively, the Mīmāṃsakas argue that the perception of the last phoneme triggers verbal knowledge, while assisted by the memory of previous phonemes (4). This, however, is unacceptable, because such memory would be caused by a mental disposition (*saṃskāra*), which would be in turn produced by the perception of each phoneme. But memory and mental dispositions are not accepted as instruments of valid knowledge, so this theory is not sound (Table 7.2).

The tenet expressed here is true for Mīmāṃsakas, but false for Vaiyākaraṇas.

Table 7.2 The theory of the last phoneme is wrong

Source	Truth val.	Pre-quote	Re-use	Post-quote	Truth val.	Point of view
pūrvavarṇaja-nitasaṃskārasahito 'ntyo varṇaḥ pratyāyakaḥ / (ŚBh ad 1.1.5, p. 55,1–2)	True	yad apy ucyate	(4) **pūrvavarṇaja-nitasaṃskārasahi-to 'ntyo varṇaḥ**[b] **pratyāyaka** (NM[Va] II, p. 146,4)	iti tad apy ayuktam	False	Vyā.

[a] pūrva] P C; pūrvapūrva NM[Va] • [b] 'ntyo varṇaḥ] P C NM[Ga]; antyavarṇaḥ NM[Va]

7.3 A Cognition Made of Memory and Perception is Impossible

The passage quoted in (4) has been interpreted by Kumārila by postulating a single, variegated cognition embracing the memory of the past phonemes and the perception of the last one, to avoid the issue raised by the Vaiyākaraṇas, namely that memory or mental dispositions of past phonemes cannot cause valid knowledge. But, argue the Vaiyākaraṇas, such a variegated and unitary cognition is also impossible, because mental dispositions cannot possibly produce a single cognition together with sense organs: mental dispositions cause recollections, while sense organs cause perceptions (Table 7.3).

Table 7.3 The variegated cognition is impossible

Source	Truth val.	Pre-quote	Re-use	Post-quote	Truth val.	Point of view
citrarūpāṃ ca tāṃ buddhiṃ sadasadvarṇagocarām / (ŚV[Ra], *sphoṭa* 111ab); apare tu saṃskāratrayajanyāṃ varṇasmaraṇarūpāṃ saṅkalanātmikām icchanti (ŚVTṬ, *sphoṭa* 112)	True	atha vadet	(5) saṅkalanājñānam ekaṃ **sadasad-varṇagocaraṃ citrā**kāraṃ[a] bhaviṣyati / tadupārūḍhāś ca varṇā arthaṃ pratyāyayiṣyanti / (NM[Va] II, p. 146, 18–19)	tad api durāśāmātram	False	Vyā.

[a] citrākāraṃ] C; *om.* NM[Ga] NM[Va]; P *n.a*

In (5) the two concepts of a variegated (*citrarūpā*) and cumulative (*saṅkalanātmikā*) cognition used by Kumārila and Uṃveka as two alternative scenarios in the theory of phonemes, seem to be reduced to a single one by Jayanta. The notion, in any case, is false from the Vaiyākaraṇas's point of view.

7.4 Language Acquisition does not Justify the Existence of Phonemes

In defense of the theory of phonemes, Mīmāṃsakas claim that language-produced knowledge requires linguistic competence, which is acquired through the repeated observation of a given pattern of phonemes in relation to their *artha* (6–7) (Table 7.4).

From the Vaiyākaraṇas' point of view it is false that language acquisition occurs through phonemes.

7.5 The Theory of Phonemes is not Supported by Common Usage

People commonly say that "from *śabda* we know an *artha*", where the use of the singular, "from *śabda*", matches the unity of the *sphoṭa*, not a plurality of phonemes (Table 7.5).

From the Vaiyākaraṇa's point of view it is correct that common usage favors the *sphoṭa*, so (8) is true. The same argument was present in the source in the form of an objection, and thus considered false there.

Table 7.4 Language acquisition does not require phonemes

Source	Truth val.	Pre-quote	Re-use	Post-quote	Truth val.	Point of view
sambandhagrahaṇavaśena varṇānām arthapratipādakatvaṃ yeṣāṃ ca yāvatāṃ yatkramakāṇāṃ ca yat tad asti, tat teṣāṃ tāvatām eva tatkramakāṇām ekavaktṛprayuktānāṃ ca pratipādakatvam ity arthaḥ (ŚVTṬ, *sphoṭa* 69)	True	nanu	(6) vyutpatti**vaśena** śabdo '**rtha**pratyāyakatām[a] upayāti / vyutpattau ca ye[b] **yāvanto yatkramakā**[c] **varṇā** yam[d] artham abhivadanto dṛṣṭāḥ, **te tāvantas tat**[e]-**kramakās tam** artham abhivadiṣyanti (NM^{Va} II, p. 147,11–13)	iti	False	Vyā.
yāvanto yādṛśā ye ca yadarthapratipādane / varṇāḥ prajñātasāmarthyās te tathaivāvabodhakāḥ // ($ŚV^{Ra}$, *sphoṭa* 69)	True	tad uktam	(7) **yāvanto yādṛśā ye ca yadarthapratipādane / varṇāḥ prajñātasāmarthyās te tathaivāvabodhakāḥ** // (NM^{Va} II, p. 146,15–16)	iti duravagamā hi varṇavartanī	False	Vyā.

[a] pratyāyakatām] P NM^{Ga} NM^{Va}; grāhakatām C • [b] ye] P C; *om.* NM^{Ga} NM^{Va} • [c] yatkramakā] P C NM^{Ga}; yatkramā NM^{Va} • [d] yam] P C NM^{Ga}; yad NM^{Va} • [e] tat] P NM^{Ga} NM^{Va}; tāvat C

Table 7.5 The theory of phonemes goes against common usages

Source	Truth val.	Pre-quote	Re-use	Post-quote	Truth val.	Point of view
nanv evam api śabdād artham pratipadyāmaha iti laukikaṃ vacanam anupapannaṃ syāt / (ŚBh 1.1.5, p. 56,1–2)	False		(8) sphoṭo 'rthapratipādakaḥ, **śabdād arthaṃ pratipadyāmaha iti** vyavahārāt (NM^{Va} II, p. 148,12)		True	Vyā.

7.6 Phonemes do not Qualify as *śabda*

To argue that *śabda* must by definition be audible, and that phonemes are audible while the *sphoṭa* is not, does not make sense, because audibility is not an exclusive character of phonemes (9) (Table 7.6).

The Mīmāṃsaka may argue that although it is not an exclusive characteristic, it is still the main one, and that the phonemes are audible while the *sphoṭa* is not. Yet, the characteristic mark of *śabda* is not the mere audibility, but rather, its capacity to cause knowledge of the *artha* (10–11). And such character belongs to the *sphoṭa*, not to phonemes.

People are erroneously led to think that phonemes are the cause of verbal knowledge only because the *sphoṭa* manifests through articulated language, but actually this idea is the result of a false-cause fallacy (12) (Table 7.6).

It is false, from the Vaiyākaraṇa's viewpoint, that the audibility of phonemes qualifies them as *śabda* (9).

(10) and (11) are false for the Mīmāṃsakas and true for the Vaiyākaraṇas, who have the interest of underscoring causality of cognition over audibility. (12), which is true for the Mīmāṃsakas, is rejected by Vaiyākaraṇas as false.

7.7 The Theory of the *sphoṭa* is not Anti-economic

The Mīmāṃsakas object that if the *sphoṭa* is manifested by phonemes, as maintained by some Vaiyākaraṇas (see above, footnote 12 on the SphS), a criticism moved against the theory of phonemes stands also against the theory of the *sphoṭa*, which basically adopts the theory of phonemes with its implications and on top of it postulates a further entity (13–14) (Table 7.7).

The economy of the theory of phonemes in (13) and (14) is true for the Mīmāṃsakas, but false for the Vaiyākaraṇas.

7.8 The *sphoṭa* is Manifested by Articulated Sound

According to other Vaiyākaraṇas, however, this is not true: the *sphoṭa* is not manifested by phonemes, but rather by phonetic sounds (*dhvani*), i.e., the combined result of breath, articulation, etc., which in any case do not have ultimate ontological status (15) (Table 7.8).

From here to the end of the first antithesis, all re-uses are of Vaiyākaraṇa texts, and thus true also in the sources.

Table 7.6 **Phonemes are not** *śabda*

Source	Truth val.	Pre-quote	Re-use	Post-quote	Truth val.	Point of view
śrotragrahaṇe hy arthe loke śabdaśabdaḥ prasiddhaḥ (ŚBh 1.1.5, p. 54,8)	True	nanu	(9) **śrotragrahaṇe hy arthe śabdaśabdaḥ prasiddhaḥ** / te ca śrotragrahaṇā iti / (NM^{Va} II, p. 149,4–5)	naitad evam	False	Vyā.
ato gakārādivyatirikto 'nyo gośabdo 'sti yato 'rthapratipattiḥ syāt (ŚBh 1.1.5, p. 54,12–13)	False		(10) tasmād **yato 'rthapratipattiḥ** sa śabdaḥ / arthapratipattiś ca sphoṭād eva, na varṇebhyaḥ iti sphoṭa eva śabdaḥ / (NM^{Va} II, p. 149,7–8)		True	Vyā.
atha gaur ity etasmin vijñāne śrotre bahavo 'rthāḥ pratibhāsante / tatra kas teṣāṃ śabda ity upakramya yenoccaritenārthapratyayo bhavati sa śabda ity upasaṃhṛtam / (ŚVTṬ, *sphoṭa* 3)	False		(11) **atha gaur ity atra śrotre**[a] **pratibhāse bahavo 'rthāḥ pratibhāsante / tatra kas teṣāṃ śabdaḥ ity upakramya** yato 'rthapratipattiḥ **sa śabda ity upasaṃhṛte** (NM^{Va} II, p. 149, 11–12)		True	Vyā.
na gauṇo 'kṣareṣu nimittabhāvaḥ, tadbhāve bhāvāt tadabhāve cābhāvāt (ŚBh 1.1.5, p. 58,3–4)	True	nanu ca	(12) iyam arthapratītir varṇeṣu **bhavatsu bhavantī teṣv abhavatsu cābhavantī** (NM^{Va} II, p. 149,15)	ucyate / […] idaṃ tv anyathāsiddham	False	Vyā.

[a] śrotre] C, GBh; śrautre P; śrotraja NM^{Ga} NM^{Va}

Table 7.7 The argument of economy is not valid

Source	Truth val.	Pre-quote	Re-use	Post-quote	Truth val.	Point of view
yasyānavayavaḥ sphoṭo vyajyate varṇabuddhibhiḥ / so 'pi paryanuyogena naivaitena vimucyate // (ŚV^{Ra}, *sphoṭa* 91)	True	nanu […] āha ca bhaṭṭaḥ	(13) **yasyānavayavaḥ sphoṭo vyajyate varṇabuddhibhiḥ** / **so 'pi paryanuyogena naivā**nena **vimucyata** (NM^{Va} II, p. 150,7–8)	iti […] naiṣa doṣaḥ	False	Vyā.
nanu saṃskārakalpanāyām adṛṣṭakalpanā / ucyate / śabdakalpanāyāṃ sā ca śabdakalpanā ca (ŚBh 1.1.5, p. 54,10)	True	bhāṣyakṛtāpi	(14) **nanu saṃskārakalpanāyām adṛṣṭakalpanā** iti āśaṅkya prativihitaṃ **śabdakalpanāyāṃ sā ca śabdakalpanā ca** (NM^{Va} II, p. 150,9–10)	iti naiṣa doṣaḥ	False	Vyā.

Table 7.8 The manifestation of the *sphoṭa*

Source	Truth val.	Pre-quote	Re-use	Post-quote	Truth val.	Point of view
indriyasyaiva saṃskāraḥ śabdasyaivobhayasya vā / kriyate dhvanibhir vādās trayo 'bhivyaktivādinām // (VP, 1.80)	True	apare tu vadanti	(15) **dhvanaya** eva sphoṭasya[a] vyañjakāḥ (NM[Va] II, p. 151,2)		True	Vyā.

[a] sphoṭasya] P C; sphoṭasya ca NM[Ga] NM[Va]

7.9 The Sentence is the Linguistic Unity

Not only are phonemes unreal, even words are fictional abstractions (16). The sentence is not a whole made of parts; rather, it belongs to a class of its own (17). One may argue that there is a one-to-one correspondence between each phonemic string and its respective *artha*, but this is not true; for instance (18), in unrelated words like *kūpa*, *yūpa*, and *sūpa*, we see that some phonemes are identical, yet there is no similarity in meaning (Table 7.9).

7.10 Words are Fictional Abstractions

The signification of words is thus a fictional device, like that of roots and suffixes. Words are an abstraction, useful for didactic purposes, etc., but devoid of ontological status (19–20) (Table 7.10).

Table 7.9 The *vākyasphoṭa*

Source	Truth val.	Pre-quote	Re-use	Post-quote	Truth val.	Point of view
padāni vākye tāny eva varṇās te ca pade yadi / varṇeṣu varṇabhagānāṃ bhedaḥ syāt paramāṇuvat // (VP, 2.28)	True		(16) avayavakalpanāyāṃ hi yathā **vākyasyā**vayavāḥ **padāni, padānām** avayavā **varṇāḥ**, evaṃ **varṇānām** apy avayavair bhavitavyam / (NM[Va] II, p. 153,12–13)		True	Vyā.
gavaye narasiṃhe cāpy ekajñānād ṛte yathā / bhāgaṃ jātyantarasyaiva sadṛśaṃ pratipadyate // (VP, 2.90)	True		(17) artho 'pi[a] vākyasyaika eva narasiṃhākāraḥ / **jātyantaraṃ** hi **narasiṃho** nāma / **na tatra**[b] narārtho nāpi siṃhārthaḥ / (NM[Va] II, p. 154,2)		True	Vyā.
na kūpasūpayūpānām anvayo 'rthasya dṛśyate / ato 'rthāntaravācitvaṃ saṃghātasyaiva gamyate // (VP, 2.169)	True		(18) **na, kūpayūpasūpānām**[c] anekākṣarānugame[d] 'py **arthā**nugamābhāvāt / (NM[Va] II, p. 154,12)		True	Vyā.

[a] 'pi] P NM[Ga] Va; 'pi ca C • [b] na tatra] P C NM[Ga]; tatra na NM[Va] • [c] yūpasūpānām] P C; sūpayūpānām NM[Ga] NM[Va] • [d] anekākṣarānugame] P; ekākānugame C; ekākṣarānugame NM[Ga] NM[Va]

Table 7.10 Words are abstractions

Source	Truth val.	Pre-quote	Re-use	Post-quote	Truth val.	Point of view
yathā pade vibhajyante prakṛtipratyayādayaḥ / apoddhāras tathā vākye padānām upapadyate // (VP, 2.10)	True		(19) kalpanāmātraṃ tv etad iyaṃ **prakṛtir** eṣa **pratyaya** iti / evaṃ **padānām** api **vākyāt** kalpanayaiva[a] apoddhāraḥ / (NM^{Va} II, p. 155,11)		True	Vyā.
apoddhṛtyaiva vākyebhyaḥ prakṛtipratyayādivad iti // (VP, 3.1.1cd)	True	tad uktam	(20) **apoddhṛtyaiva**[b] **vākyebhyaḥ prakṛtipratyayādivad** // (NM^{Va} II, p. 155,12–13)	iti	True	Vyā.

[a] vākyāt kalpanayaiva] C; vākyāt kalpanayoddhāraḥ P; vākyārthaparikalpanayaiva NM^{Ga} NM^{Va} • [b] apoddhṛtyaiva] C GBh; padaṃ kaiścid dvidhā bhinnaṃ caturdhā pañcadhāpi vā / apoddhṛtyaiva P NM^{Ga} NM^{Va}

In (20), remarkably, while in C and GBh only the second hemistich of VP 3.1.1 is present, in P and in the vulgata also the first hemistich is present. C and GBh, when reading together, are evidence of an earlier stage of the NM transmission.

Table 7.11 The absolute unity, *śabda*

Source	Truth val.	Pre-quote	Re-use	Post-quote	Truth val.	Point of view
anādinidhanam brahma śabdatattvaṃ yad akṣaram / vivartate ’rthabhāvena prakriyā jagato yataḥ // (VP, 1.1)	True		(21) **śabdabrahmai**vedam advayam[a] anādyavidyāvāsanopaplavamānabhedam **arthabhāvena vivartate** / (NM^{Va} II, pp. 156,20–157,1)		True	Vyā.
na so ’sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamād ṛte / anuviddham iva jñānaṃ sarvaṃ śabdena bhāsate // (VP, 1.131)	True		(22) vāgrūpatā tu[b] tattvaṃ sarvatra[c] **pratyaye**, tadanapāyāt / (NM^{Va} II, p. 157,3)		True	Vyā.
vāgrūpatā ced utkrāmed avabodhasya śāśvatī / na prakāśaḥ prakāśeta sā hi pratyavamarśinī // (VP, 1.132)	True	yathoktam	(23) **vāgrūpatā ced utkrāmed avabodhasya śāśvatī / na prakāśaḥ prakāśeta sā hi pratyavamarśinī** // (NM^{Va} II, p. 157,5–6)	iti[d]	True	Vyā.

[a] advayam] P NM^{Ga} NM^{Va}; *om.* C • [b] tu] P C; *om.* NM^{Ga} NM^{Va} • [c] sarvatra] P C; sarva NM^{Ga} NM^{Va} • [d] iti] NM^{Ga} NM^{Va}; *om.* P C

Table 7.12 The threefold *śabda*

Source	Truth val.	Pre-quote	Re-use	Post-quote	Truth val.	Point of view
vaikharyā madhyamāyāś ca paśyantyāś caitad adbhutam / anekatīrthabhedāyās trayyā vācaḥ paraṃ padam // (VP, 1.159)	True		(24) sā ceyaṃ vāk traividhyena vyavasthitā[a] avabhāsate, **vaikharī madhyamā paśyantī** / (NM^{Va} II, p. 157,8)	iti	True	Vyā.
sthāneṣu vivṛte vāyau kṛtavarṇaparigrahā / vaikharī vāk prayoktṝṇāṃ prāṇavṛttinibandhanā // (VP, 1.165)	True	tad uktam	(25) **sthāneṣu vivṛte**[b] **vāyau kṛtavarṇa-parigrahā / vaikharī vāk prayoktṝṇāṃ prāṇavṛttini-bandhanā** // (NM^{Va} II, p. 157,12–13)	iti	True	Vyā.
kevalaṃ buddhyupādānā kramarūpānupātinī / prāṇavṛttim atikramya madhyamā vāk pravartate // (VP, 1.166)	True	tad uktam	(26) **kevalaṃ buddhyupādānā kramarūpānupātinī / prāṇavṛttim atikramya madhyamā vāk pravartate** // (NM^{Va} II, p. 158,1–2)	iti	True	Vyā.
avibhāgā tu paśyantī sarvataḥ saṃhṛta-kramā / svarūpajyotir evāntaḥ sūkṣmā vāg anapāyinī // (VP, 1.167)	True	tad uktam	(27) **avibhāgāt tu paśyantī sarvataḥ saṃhṛtakramā / svarūpajyotir evāntaḥ sūkṣmā vāg anapāyinī** // (NM^{Va} II, p. 158,5–6)	iti	True	Vyā.

[a] vyavasthitā] P C; vyavasthitaiva NM^{Ga} NM^{Va} • [b] vivṛte] P NM^{Ga} Va; vidhṛte C

7.11 *Śabda* is the Absolute, Indivisible Reality

The absolute reality is an indivisible *śabda*, while fictional differences are nothing more than instruments to move towards an awareness of the *śabda* unity, or didactic means to describe language (21–23) (Table 7.11).

7.12 The Threefold Manifestation of *śabda*

Even if in reality it is one and indivisible, *śabda* manifests in the world of phenomena in three aspects, *vaikhārī*, *madhyamā*, and *paśyantī* (24–27) (Table 7.12).

8 Second Antithesis: Re-use in the Refutation of the *sphoṭa*

With the exception of (40) below, in this section both re-uses and sources are arguments presented from the Mīmāṃsaka viewpoint, so they express true concepts both in the source and in the re-use.

8.1 Sequential Phonemes Can Cause a Cumulative Cognition

In response to the Vaiyākaraṇas' objections (see Table 7.1), the Mīmāṃsakas argue that the sequential utterance of phonemes is not an issue: although phonemes are uttered and grasped in sequence, they still are, collectively, the cause of verbal

Table 8.1 Sequential causes can result in a cumulative effect

Source	Truth val.	Pre-quote	Re-use	Post-quote	Truth val.	Point of view
ekasādhanasaṃsthāś ca vyāpārāvayavā yadā / svarūpato nirīkṣyante yaugapadyam asat tadā // kiṃ punar bahavo bhinnābhinnasādhanasaṃśritāḥ / bhaveyur yaugapadyena vyāpārāḥ kramavartinaḥ // (ŚV^{Ra}, *sphoṭa* 77–78)	True		(28) tathaikānuvākagrahaṇe saṃsthānāṃ kramabhāvinīnām api sāmastye sati sāmarthyam, **ekayā**pi[a] **saṃsthayā** vinā[b] tadāmukhī[c]karaṇāsambhavād / (NM^{Va} II, p. 160,6–7)		True	Mīm.
darśapūrṇamāsābhyām ity upapadasamarpitasāhityetikartavyatāviśiṣṭānām āgneyādīnām ekapreryaviśeṣaṇotpādakatvaṃ krameṇa, karaṇānām āgneyādīnāṃ kṣaṇikatvena yaugapadyāsambhavāt / (ŚVTṬ, *sphoṭa* 74)	True		(29) vede 'pi **darśapūrṇamāsābhyām** ity[d] atra[e] itaretarayogaśaṃsinā dvandvena samarpitasāhityānām **āgneyādi**yāgānāṃ pakṣadvaya[f]prayojyatvena cāparihārya **kramāṇām** ekādhikārasampādakatvaṃ **dṛṣṭam** / (NM^{Va} II, p. 160,8–10)		True	Mīm.
abhyāse caindravāyavādīnām ekādhikāraniṣpādakatvam / loke 'pi padādhyayanādīnām ekānuvākagrahaṇasādhakatvam / (ŚVTṬ, *sphoṭa* 74)	True		(30) tathā **aindravāyavaṃ** gṛhṇāti, āśvinaṃ gṛhṇāti iti somagraha[g]**grahaṇā**bhyāsānāṃ samastānāṃ kramabhāvināṃ caikapradhānanirvartakatvaṃ dṛṣṭam iti / (NM^{Va} II, p. 160,10–12)		True	Mīm.

[a] ekayāpi] P C; ekayā NM^{Ga} NM^{Va} • [b] vinā] P C NM^{Ga}; *om.* NM^{Va} • [c] āmukhī] P NM^{Ga} NM^{Va}; abhimukhī C • [d] ity] P NM^{Ga} NM^{Va}; *om.* C NM^{Ga} NM^{Va} • [e] atra] P; *om.* C NM^{Ga} NM^{Va} • [f] dvaya] P C; dvaye NM^{Ga} NM^{Va} • [g] graha] P C; *om.* NM^{Ga} NM^{Va}

knowledge. Instances of collective and sequential causes that bring about a cumulative effect are well known, as in the case of drills to memorize verses (28) or of intermediate sacrifices (29–30) in the economy of the main one (Table 8.1).

8.2 Dispositions and Memory in the Theory of Phonemes

The principle that the perception of the last phoneme triggers verbal knowledge, aided by the memory of the previous phonemes (31), which was quoted and refuted by the Vaiyākaraṇas (see Table 7.2), actually stands valid. Objections on the capacity of dispositions to produce verbal knowledge do not hold, if we understand "mental disposition" as *vāsanā*, a quality of the self. From observation we know that perceptions cause dispositions, and observation is a universal instrument of knowledge (33). And it would be silly to ask "From where does such a mental disposition arise?", because everyone knows that mental dispositions are caused by perception (34) (Table 8.2).

(31) was also quoted above (see Table 7.2). In that occasion the line in favor of atomism was not credited, unlike here. It could be because of the obviousness of the source, but it is quite likely that the absence of credits had rhetoric implications: the honorific *tatrabhāvatā* stresses the authoritativeness of the statement, while in

Table 8.2 Phonemes, dispositions, and memory

Source	Truth val.	Pre-quote	Re-use	Post-quote	Truth val.	Point of view
pūrvavarṇaja-nitasaṃskārasahito 'ntyo varṇaḥ (ŚBh ad 1.1.5, p. 55,1–2)	True		(31) **pūrvavarṇa-janitasaṃskārasahito 'ntyo varṇa**[a] (NM^{Va} II, p. 163,14)	iti tatrabhāvatā mīmāṃsabhā-ṣyakṛtā varṇitam	True	Mīm.
athavā gakārādivijñānajani-tavāsanām evāha bhāṣyakāraḥ saṃskāraśabdena / tadviśiṣṭasyai-vāntyāvayava-syārthapratipattau hetutvaṃ smaraṇānyathānupapat-tipramāṇakam / (ŚVTṬ, *sphoṭa* 99)	True		(32) […] varṇānubhava-saṃskṛtamateḥ puṃsaḥ arthapratītidarśanāt / na hi smaraṇaśaktiḥ **saṃskāraḥ** / kin tv ātmaguṇo **vāsanā**khyaḥ / sa ca smṛtim ivārthapratītim api janayitum utsahate (NM^{Va} II, p. 164,7–8)		True	Mīm.
sarvatra no darśanaṃ pramāṇam / (ŚBh ad 1.1.5, p. 53,1–2)	True		(33) **sarvatra no darśanaṃ pramāṇam /** (NM^{Va} II, p. 164,9)		True	N.
tad uktam / vastudharmo hy eṣa yad anubhavapaṭīyān smṛtibījam ādhatte iti / (ŚVTṬ, *sphoṭa* 100, found also in PSṬ, Ch. 1, Part 1, 1.5, p. 49,10)	True	tathā cāhuḥ	(34) **vastudharmo hy eṣa, yad anubhavaḥ paṭīyān smṛtibījam ādhatte** / (NM^{Va} II, p. 164,18–19)	iti	True	Mīm.

[a] 'ntyo varṇa-] P C; 'ntyavarṇa NM^{Ga} NM^{Va}

the previous case, where the argument is developed from the Vaiyākaraṇas' perspective, the authoritativeness of the source was meant to be undermined.

In (32) Jayanta gives a Vaiśeṣika twist to the word *saṃskāra* used by Śabara, interpreting it as the quality of the self called *vāsanā*. The latter term is also used by Uṃveka in the immediate context.

8.3 The Theory of Phonemes is More Economical

Alternatively, the Mīmāṃsakas may concede that mental dispositions do not cause knowledge of the *artha* directly. Yet, they can do it through memory: mental dispositions of the past individual phonemes in sequence, together with the perception of the last one, cause a new mental disposition that produces the memory of the full word, which in turn causes the knowledge of the *artha*. When the Vaiyākaraṇas argue that this theory is anti-economical, the Mīmāṃsakas, with Śabara, reply that they are postulating a single entity (the mental disposition), while the Vaiyākaraṇas necessarily must postulate two (the *sphoṭa* and the mental dispositions, through which the *sphoṭa* manifests) (35).

When the Vaiyākaraṇas claim that, at least, they did not violate the law that mental dispositions cause only memory, the Mīmāṃsakas reply that they did indeed violate it, because when they deal with the cause of the manifestation of the *sphoṭa* (see Table 7.8), they have to explain it in a similar way. In addition, they postulate the *sphoṭa* (36).

And the explanation of the gradual manifestation of the *sphoṭa* does not hold, because knowledge of an *artha* is not a gradual, but rather a sudden phenomenon (37) (Table 8.3).

Table 8.3 The economy of the theory of phonemes

Source	Truth val.	Pre-quote	Re-use	Post-quote	Truth val.	Point of view
śabdakalpanāyāṃ sā ca śabdakalpanā ca / (ŚBh ad 1.1.5, p. 54,10)	True	uktam atra sugṛhī tanāmnā bhāṣyakāreṇa	(35) **śabdakalpanāyāṃ sā ca śabdakalpanā ca** (NM^{Va} II, p. 166,3)	iti	True	bhāṣyakāra (Mīm.)
sadbhāvavyatirekau ca tathāvayavavarjanam / tavādhikaṃ bhavet tasmād yatno 'sāv arthabuddhiṣu // (ŚV^{Ra}, *sphoṭa* 94)	True	tad uktam	(36) **sadbhāvavyatirekau ca tathāvayavavarjanam / tavādhikaṃ bhavet tasmād yatno 'sāv arthabuddhiṣu //** (NM^{Va} II, p. 167,1–2)	iti	True	Mīm.
alpīyasāpi yatnena śabdam uccaritaṃ matiḥ / yadi vā naiva gṛhṇāti varṇaṃ vā sakalaṃ sphuṭam // (ŚV^{Ra}, *sphoṭa* 10)	True	yathoktam	(37) **alpīyasāpi yatnena śabdam uccaritaṃ**[a] **matiḥ / yadi vā naiva gṛhṇāti varṇaṃ vā sakalaṃ sphuṭam //** (NM^{Va} II, p. 167, 11–12)		True	Mīm.

[a] uccaritaṃ] P C; uccāritaṃ NM^{Ga} NM^{Va}

8.4 The Sequence is a Property of Phonemes

The sequence is just a property of phonemes, so no entity needs to be postulated in addition to the phonemes (38) (Table 8.4).

8.5 The *sphoṭa* does not Qualify as *śabda*

Phonemes are the only basic linguistic elements, other fictional entities are not required (39); *śabda* is said to be of two types, articulated and not articulated, and the *sphoṭa* is neither of these two (40) (Table 8.5).

(40) is one of the rare cases, in NM 6, in which Jayanta quotes from his own tradition.

Table 8.4 The sequence is not a separate entity

Source	Truth val.	Pre-quote	Re-use	Post-quote	Truth val.	Point of view
dvaye saty api tenātra vijñeyo 'rthasya vācakaḥ / varṇāḥ kiṃ nu kramopetāḥ kiṃ nu varṇāśrayaḥ kramaḥ // kramaḥ kramavatām aṅgam iti kiṃ yuktisādhyatā / dharmamātram asau teṣāṃ na vastvantaram iṣyate // (ŚV[Dvā], śabdanityatā 285–286)	True	tatra coktam	(38) **dvaye saty api tenātra vijñeyo 'rthasya vācakaḥ / varṇāḥ kiṃ nu kramopetāḥ kiṃ nu varṇāśrayaḥ kramaḥ // kramaḥ kramavatām aṅgam iti kiṃ yuktisādhyatā / dharmamātram asau teṣāṃ na vastvanta-ram iṣyate** // (NM[Va] II, p. 169,12–15)		True	Mīm.

Table 8.5 The *sphoṭa* is not *śabda*

Source	Truth val.	Pre-quote	Re-use	Post-quote	Truth val.	Point of view
parasparānapekṣāś ca śrotrabuddhyā svarūpataḥ / varṇā evāvasīyante na pūrvāparavastunī // (ŚV[Ra], *sphoṭa* 9)	True	tad uktam	(39) **parasparānapekṣāś ca śrotra[a]buddhyā svarūpataḥ / varṇā evāvasīyante na pūrvāparavastunī** // (NM[Va] II, p. 172, 14–15)	iti	True	Mīm.
dvividhaś cāyaṃ śabdo varṇātmā dhvanimātraś ca / (NBh ad 2.2.40)	True	tad uktam bhāṣyakṛtā	(40) **dvividhaś cāyaṃ[b] śabdo varṇātmā dhvanimātraś ca** (NM[Va] II, p. 173,7)	iti	True	bhāṣyakṛt (Nyā.)

[a] śrotra] P C NM[Ga]; śrautra NM[Va] • [b] cāyaṃ] P NM[Ga] NM[Va]; tv ayaṃ C

Table 8.6 The smallest unity of *śabda*

Source	Truth val.	Pre-quote	Re-use	Post-quote	Truth val.	Point of view
śaighryād alpāntaratvāc ca gośabde sā bhaved api / devadattādiśabdeṣu sphuṭo bhedaḥ pratīyate // (ŚV^{Ra}, *sphoṭa* 121)	True		(41) bhinnājupaśleṣe tu **devadatta** ity **ādau** nānākṣaragrahaṇam eva vilambitam anubhūyate / (NM^{Va} II, p. 174,12–13)		True	Mīm.
alpīyasāpi yatnena śabdam uccaritaṃ matiḥ / yadi vā naiva gṛhṇāti varṇaṃ vā sakalaṃ sphuṭam // (ŚV^{Ra}, *sphoṭa* 10)	True	sūktaṃ hy etat[a]	(42) **alpīyasāpi yatnena śabdam uccaritaṃ**[b] **matiḥ / yadi vā naiva gṛhṇāti varṇaṃ vā sakalaṃ sphuṭam //** (NM^{Va} II, p. 179,17–18)		True	Mīm.

[a] sūktaṃ hy etat] P; uktam hy etat C; tathā hy uktam etat NM^{Va} • [b] uccaritaṃ] P C; uccāritaṃ NM^{Ga} NM^{Va}

8.6 The Smallest *śabda* Unity is the Phoneme

While in short words such as “cow” there is an impression of unity due to the brevity of the sound, there are many long words, such as “Devadatta” where the differences of sounds composing the word are clearly audible (41).

The Vaiyākaraṇas proposed the *reductio ad absurdum* that if sentences are made of words and words are made of phonemes, also phonemes must have parts. But parts of phonemes are never perceived: a phoneme is either fully perceived, or it is not perceived at all (42) (Table 8.6).

Table 9.1 Re-uses from the NS

Source	Truth val.	Pre-quote	Re-use	Post-quote	Truth val.	Point of view
pratyakṣānumāno-pamānaśabdāḥ pramāṇāni (NS, p. 1.1.4)	True	tad āha sūtrakāraḥ	(43) **pratyakṣā-numāno-pamānaśabdāḥ pramāṇāni //** (NM^{Va} I, p. 71,6)		True	Akṣapāda
[…] tattvajñānān niḥśreyasādhi-gamaḥ (NS, p. 1.1.1)	True	akṣapādas tāvad evam upadiṣṭavān	(44) **ātmajñānān niḥśreyasādhi-gamaḥ (NM^{Va} II, p. 461,9–10)**	iti	True	Akṣapāda
tattvādhya-vasyāyasaṃra-kṣaṇārthaṃ jalpavitaṇḍe bījaprarohasaṃ-rakṣaṇārthaṃ kaṇṭakaśākhā-varaṇavat (NS, p. 4.2.50)	True	samāhitam etad bhagavatā sūtrakāreṇaiva	(45) **tattvādhya-vasyāyasaṃrakṣa-ṇārthaṃ jalpa-vitaṇḍe bījapraro-hasaṃrakṣa-ṇārthaṃ kaṇṭaka-śākhāparivara-ṇavat (NM^{Va} II, p. 648,3–4)**	iti vadatā	True	Akṣapāda

Table 9.2 Uncredited re-uses from the NBh

Source	Truth val.	Pre-quote	Re-use	Post-quote	Truth val.	Point of view
tattvasya jñānaṃ niḥśreyasasyādhigama iti ca karmaṇi ṣaṣṭhyau (NBh ad 1.1.1, p. 2,11)	True		(46) **tattvasya jñānaṃ niḥśreyasyādhigama iti karmaṇi ṣaṣṭhyau** (NM^{Va} I, p. 19,7)		True	Nyā.
saṃśayādayo hi yathāsambhavaṃ pramāṇeṣu prameyeṣu cāntarbhavanto (NBh ad 1.1.1, p. 2,17–18)	True		(47) **saṃśayādayas** tu padārthā **yathāsambhavaṃ pramāṇeṣu prameyeṣu**[a] **ca**[b] **antarbhavanto** (NM^{Va} I, p. 23,1–2)		True	Nyā.
tatra nānupalabdhe na nirṇīte 'rthe nyāyaḥ pravartate / kiṃ tarhi / saṃśayite 'rthe / (NBh ad 1.1.1, p. 3,3–4)	True		(48) **tatra nānupalabdhe 'rthe na nirṇīte pravartate / kiṃ** tu **saṃśayite nyāyas** tadaṅgaṃ tena saṃśayaḥ // (NM^{Va} I, p. 23,4–5)		True	Nyā.
trividhā cāsya śāstrasya pravṛttir uddeśo lakṣaṇaṃ parīkṣā ceti / tatra nāmadheyena padārthamātrasyābhidhānam uddeśaḥ / uddiṣṭasya tattvavyavasthāpako dharmo lakṣaṇam / lakṣitasya yathālakṣaṇam upapadyate na veti pramāṇair avadhāraṇaṃ parīkṣā / (NBh ad 1.1.1, p. 8,7–9)	True		(49) **trividhā cāsya śāstrasya pravṛttir**[c] **uddeśo lakṣaṇaṃ parīkṣeti**[d] / **nāmadheyena padārthābhidhānamātram**[e] **uddeśaḥ / uddiṣṭasya tattvavyavasthāpako dharmo lakṣaṇam**[f] / **lakṣitasya tallakṣaṇam**[g] **upapadyate na veti** vicāraḥ[h] **parīkṣā** / (NM^{Va} I, p. 29,5–8)		True	Nyā.

[a] pramāṇeṣu prameyeṣu] C NM^{Ga} NM^{Va}; prameyapramāṇeṣu P • [b] ca] C NM^{Ga} NM^{Va}; *om.* P • [c] pravṛttir] C NM^{Ga} NM^{Va}; gatiḥ P • [d] parīkṣeti] P C; parīkṣā ceti NM^{Ga} NM^{Va} • [e] mātram] C; *om.* P NM^{Ga} NM^{Va} • [f] dharmo lakṣaṇam] P NM^{Ga} NM^{Va}; dharmopalakṣaṇam C • [g] tallakṣaṇam] C NM^{Ga} NM^{Va}; tallakṣaṇam idam P • [h] vicāraḥ] C NM^{Ga} NM^{Va}; *om.* P

Table 9.3 Credited re-uses from the NBh

Source	Truth val.	Pre-quote	Re-use	Post-quote	Truth val.	Point of view
pradīpaḥ sarvavidyānām upāyaḥ sarvakarmaṇām / āśrayaḥ sarvadharmāṇāṃ vidyoddeśe prakīrtitā // (NBh ad 1.1.1, p. 5,19–20)	True	āha ca bhāṣyakāraḥ	(50) **pradīpaḥ sarvavidyānām upāyaḥ sarva-karmaṇām** / **āśrayaḥ sarva-dharmāṇāṃ vidyoddeśe** parīkṣitā // (NM^{Va} I, p. 28,14–15)	iti	True	Vātsyā-yana
agnir āptopadeśāt pratīyate amutrāgnir iti / pratyāsīdatā dhūmadar-śanenānumīyate / pratyāsannena ca pratyakṣata upalabhyate / vyavasthā punaḥ agnihotraṃ juhuyāt svargakāma iti / laukikasya svarge na liṅgadarśanaṃ na pratyakṣam / stanayitnuśabde śrūyamāṇe śabdahetāv anumānam / tatra na pratyakṣaṃ nāgamaḥ / pāṇau pratyakṣata upalabhyamāne nānumānaṃ nāgama iti / (NBh ad 1.1.3, p. 9,11–16)	True	tad udāhāraṇaṃ - tu bhāṣya-kāraḥ pradarśitavān	(51) **agnir āptopadeśāt pratīyate 'mutreti** / **pratyāsīdatā dhūmadarśanenā-numīyate** / **pratyāsannatareṇa upalabhyata** ityādi / kvacit tu **vyavasthā** dṛśyate yathā **agnihotraṃ juhuyāt svargakāma iti** asmadāder āgamād eva jñānam, na pratyakṣā-numānābhyām / **stanayitnuśab-daśravaṇāt** tad**dhetu**parijñānam **anumānād** eva, na **pratyakṣāga-mābhyām** / svahastādau tu **pratyakṣād** eva pratītiḥ, na **śabdānumānā-bhyām** (NM^{Va} I, p. 93,5–13)	iti	True	Vātsyā-yana
yat punar anumānaṃ pratyakṣāga-maviruddhaṃ nyāyābhāsaḥ sa iti (NBh ad 1.1.1, p. 3,13–14)	True	bhāṣyakāreṇa uktam	(52) **yat punar anumānaṃ pratyakṣāgamavi-ruddhaṃ nyāyābhāsaḥ sa** (NM^{Va} I, p. 293, 14–15)	iti	True	Vātsyā-yana

Table 9.3 continued

Source	Truth val.	Pre-quote	Re-use	Post-quote	Truth val.	Point of view
pramāṇena khalv ayaṃ jñātārtham upalabhya tam īpsati vā jihāsati vā / tasyepsājihāsāprayuktasya samīhā pravṛttir ity ucyate / sāmarthyaṃ punar asyāḥ phalenābhisambandhaḥ / (NBh ad 1.1.1, p. 1,7–9)	True		(53) **pramāṇena khalv ayaṃ jñātārtham upalabhya tam īpsati vā jihāsati vā / tasyepsājihāsāprayuktasya samīhā pravṛttir ucyate / sāmarthyaṃ punar asyāḥ phalenābhisambandhaḥ** / (NM^{Va} II, p. 135,12–14)	iti ca bruvāṇo bhāṣyakāraḥ […]	True	Vātsyāyana
nigrahasthānebhyaḥ pṛthag uddiṣṭā hetvābhāsā vāde codanīyā bhaviṣyantīti / (NBh ad 1.1.1, p. 5,13)	True		(54) **nigrahasthānebhyaḥ pṛthag** upa**diṣṭā hetvābhāsā vāde codanīyā bhaviṣyanti** (NM^{Va} II, p. 597,19–20)	iti bhāṣyakāra vacanāt	True	Vātsyāyana

9 Re-use from Nyāya Sources

In Tables 9.1–3 there is a small sample of re-uses from the NS and the NBh, as a term of comparison with the above-listed sources from other traditions. In Table 9.1, three quotations of the NS are shown, as an example of the many occurring in the NM. In Table 9.2, there are some re-uses from the NBh without an explicit mention of the NBh author. Finally, in Table 9.3, a few NBh re-uses with an explicit attribution are listed.

10 Conclusions

In Tables 10.1, 10.2 and 10.3 some characteristics of all the above re-uses are summarized for a better appreciation of specific patterns. The sequential number is shown in bold typeface when the re-use is a quotation. The context shows how re-uses constitute the back-bone of the whole argumentation in favor and against the *sphoṭa*. It would be possible, indeed, to make sense of the main structure of the *sphoṭa* section just by following the concatenation of arguments present in the quotations. The sequence of the arguments, however, differs from that found in previous sources, so Jayanta's claim of his role as a re-arranger seems corroborated by this survey.

In the re-uses surveyed here there are always three subjects involved: besides Jayanta himself (the Nyāya exponent), in fact, a dialog is staged between a symbolic re-user and the utterer of a re-used source, in the present case alternatively the Vaiyākaraṇa or the Mīmāṃsaka. The symbolic re-user is in some cases explicitly

Table 10.1 *Sphoṭa* defense

	Author of source	Context of re-used passage	Symbolic re-user of text	Epist. val.: author of source	Epist. val.: symb. re-user	Epist. val.: Jayanta
Objections (Mīmāṃsaka) and Counter-objections (Vaiyākaraṇa)						
(1)	Kumārila	Rejection of simultaneity of phonemes	Vyā.	**True**	**True**	**True**
(2)	Kumārila	Rejection of simultaneity of phonemes	Vyā.	**True**	**True**	**True**
(3)	Kumārila, Uṃveka	Necessity of sequence of phonemes	Vyā.	**True**	**True**	**True**
(4)	Śabara	Process of signification of phonemes	yad ucyate (Śabara, Mīm.)	True	False	?
(5)	Kumārila	Variegated or cumulative sonic image	Vyā.	True	False	?
(6)	Uṃveka	Phonemes are necessary to acquire language competence	Vyā.	**True**	False	**True**
(7)	Kumārila	Phonemes are necessary to acquire language competence	tad uktam (Kumārila, Mīm.)	**True**	False	**True**
(8)	Śabara	Common usage of language supports the *sphoṭa*	Vyā.	**False**	True	**False**
(9)	Śabara	Phonemes are audible, thus they are *śabda*	Vyā.	**True**	False	**True**
(10)	Śabara	*śabda* is the cause of knowledge of the *artha*, i.e. the *sphoṭa*	Vyā.	**False**	True	**False**
(11)	Uṃveka	*śabda* is the cause of knowledge of the *artha*, i.e. the *sphoṭa*	Vyā.	**False**	True	**False**
(12)	Śabara	The phonemes as signifiers	Vyā.	**True**	False	**True**
(13)	Kumārila	The theory of phonemes is more economical	bhaṭṭa (Mīm.)	**True**	False	**True**
(14)	Śabara	The theory of phonemes is more economical	bhāṣyakṛt (Mīm.)	**True**	False	**True**

Table 10.1 continued

	Author of source	Context of re-used passage	Symbolic re-user of text	Epist. val.: author of source	Epist. val.: symb. re-user	Epist. val.: Jayanta
Verdict (Vaiyākaraṇa)						
(15)	Bhartṛhari	The *sphoṭa* is manifested through articulate sound	apare (Vyā.)	True	True	**False**
(16)	Bhartṛhari	Phonemes and words are fictional abstractions	Vyā.	True	True	**False**
(17)	Bhartṛhari	The sentence is not a whole made of parts	Vyā.	True	True	**False**
(18)	Bhartṛhari	Phonemes have no independent meaning	Vyā.	True	True	**False**
(19)	Bhartṛhari	Words are fictional abstractions	Vyā.	True	True	**False**
(20)	Bhartṛhari	Words are fictional abstractions	tad uktam (Bhartṛhari, Vyā.)	True	True	**False**
(21)	Bhartṛhari	Divisions of *śabdabrahman* as tools	Vyā.	True	True	**False**
(22)	Bhartṛhari	Divisions of *śabdabrahman* as tools	Vyā.	True	True	**False**
(23)	Bhartṛhari	Divisions of *śabdabrahman* as tools	yathoktam (Bhartṛhari, Vyā.)	True	True	**False**
(24)	Bhartṛhari	The three-fold *śabda*	Vyā.	True	True	**False**
(25)	Bhartṛhari	The three-fold *śabda*	tad uktam (Bhartṛhari, Vyā.)	True	True	**False**
(26)	Bhartṛhari	The three-fold *śabda*	tad uktam (Bhartṛhari)	True	True	**False**
(27)	Bhartṛhari	The three-fold *śabda*	tad uktam (Bhartṛhari)	True	True	**False**

mentioned, and in others clearly identifiable in the flow of the argument, according to his role in the debate either as proponent (*pakṣin*) or opponent (*pratipakṣin*).

Although the Mīmāṃsaka role in the staged debate is that of presenting a second antithesis (*uttarapakṣa*) and not a final verdict (*siddhānta*) one cannot fail to notice how Jayanta's views are very close to the Mīmāṃsaka's, so much so that in the present list of re-uses, insofar as the truth value of the statements, Jayanta almost invariably agrees with the Mīmāṃsaka. In these conclusive tables, the truth values seen from Jayanta's viewpoint are in bold face, together with the truth values of those who agree with him.

Table 10.2 *Sphoṭa* refutation

	Author of re-used text	Context of re-used passage	Symbolic re-user of text	Epist. val. according to author of source	Epist. val. according to symbolic re-user	Epist. val. according to Jayanta
Counter-verdict (Mīmāṃsaka)						
(28)	Kumārila	Phonemes in sequence produce a cumulative effect	Mīm.	**True**	**True**	**True**
(29)	Uṃveka	Phonemes in sequence produce a cumulative effect	Mīm.	**True**	**True**	**True**
(30)	Uṃveka	Phonemes in sequence produce a cumulative effect	Mīm.	**True**	**True**	**True**
(31)	Śabara	The last phoneme triggers knowledge of the *artha*	tatrabhāvān mīmāṃsā-bhāṣyakṛt (Mīm.)	**True**	**True**	**True**
(32)	Uṃveka	Dispositions are qualities of the self	Mīm.	**True**	**True**	**True**
(33)	Śabara	Perception is the main instrument of knowledge	Mīm.	**True**	**True**	**True**
(34)	Uṃveka	Perceptions produce dispositions, which produce memory	tathā cāhuḥ (Mīm.)	**True**	**True**	**True**
(35)	Śabara	The theory of phonemes is more economical	sugṛhītanāma-bhāṣyakāra, Mīm.	**True**	**True**	**True**
(36)	Kumārila	The theory of the *sphoṭa* is anti-economical	tad uktam (Kumārila, Mīm.)	**True**	**True**	**True**
(37)	Kumārila	A gradual manifestation of the *sphoṭa* is impossible	yathoktam (Kumārila)	**True**	**True**	**True**
(38)	Kumārila	The sequence is a property of phonemes, not an additional postulation like the *sphoṭa*	tatra coktam (Kumārila, Mīm.)	**True**	**True**	**True**
(39)	Kumārila	The *sphoṭa* does not qualify as *śabda*	tad uktam (Kumārila, Mīm.)	**True**	**True**	**True**
(40)	Pakṣilasvāmin	The *sphoṭa* does not qualify as *śabda*	bhāṣyakṛt (Mīm.)	**True**	**True**	**True**
(41)	Kumārila	The smallest *śabda* unity is the phoneme	Mīm.	**True**	**True**	**True**
(42)	Kumārila	The smallest *śabda* unity is the phoneme	sūktaṃ hy etat (Kumārila, Mīm.)	**True**	**True**	**True**

Table 10.3 Nyāya sources

	Author of re-used text	Context of re-used passage	Symbolic re-user of text	Epist. val. according to author of source	Epist. val. according to symbolic re-user	Epist. val. according to Jayanta
Re-uses from the NS						
(43)	Akṣapāda	The instruments of knowledge	tad āha sūtrakāraḥ (Nyā.)	**True**	**True**	**True**
(44)	Akṣapāda	Knowledge of the self leads to the *summum bonum*	akṣapādas tāvad evam upadiṣṭavān (Nyā.)	**True**	**True**	**True**
(45)	Akṣapāda	The purpose of *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā*	samāhitam etad bhagavatā sūtrakāreṇa (Nyā.)	**True**	**True**	**True**
Uncredited re-uses from the NBh						
(46)	Vātsyāyana	The syntax of NS 1.1.1	Nyā.	**True**	**True**	**True**
(47)	Vātsyāyana	The relation of *pramāṇa* and *prameya* with the other *padārtha*s	Nyā.	**True**	**True**	**True**
(48)	Vātsyāyana	Inference is used to solve doubts	Nyā.	**True**	**True**	**True**
(49)	Vātsyāyana	The three *pravṛtti*s: *uddeśa*, *lakṣaṇa* and *parīkṣā*	Nyā.	**True**	**True**	**True**
Credited re-uses from the NBh						
(50)	Vātsyāyana	Ānvīkṣikī is the supreme science	āha ca bhāṣyakāraḥ (Nyā.)	**True**	**True**	**True**
(51)	Vātsyāyana	The convergence of instruments of knowledge in a single object	tad udāhāraṇaṃ tu bhāṣyakāraḥ pradarśitavān (Nyā.)	**True**	**True**	**True**
(52)	Vātsyāyana	Pseudo-inferences	bhāṣyakāreṇa uktam (Nyā.)	**True**	**True**	**True**
(53)	Vātsyāyana	Definition of *pravṛtti*	iti ca bruvāṇo bhāṣyakāraḥ (Nyā.)	**True**	**True**	**True**
(54)	Vātsyāyana	The scope of pseudo-logical reasons	iti bhāṣyakāravacanāt (Nyā.)	**True**	**True**	**True**

Throughout the NM, when not explicitly credited to the author, quotations are almost invariably introduced by *tad uktam*, or, more rarely, *yathoktam*. The overwhelming percentage of quotations thus introduced is in verse or *sūtra* form. This *tad uktam* pre-quote expression can be considered Jayanta's marker for a precise quotation, so much so that it may be used as a valuable clue to identify quotations from undetermined or lost works. Also, it is a signal that the specific tradition derived from the context, in the above cases Vyākaraṇa and Mīmāṃsā, is symbolized in the quotation. Unlike Śabara and Kumārila, Bhartṛhari is never explicitly credited. Since Jayanta's views are certainly closer to the Mīmāṃsakas's, such explicit credits could by themselves be not only tokens of respect, but also of the trustworthiness of the source.

The almost invariable concomitance of the *tad uktam* formula with quoted verses and aphorisms may have several reasons. It is possible that verses were more suited for quotation purposes, for mnemonic reasons, and that therefore Jayanta thinks more appropriate to introduce them with an explicit "so it was said". It is also possible that verses and aphorisms, since they were more easily memorized and thus faithfully transmitted, enjoyed a special status as *śabdapramāṇa* in Jayanta's perspective.

It is remarkable how differently re-uses from Nyāya sources are treated. First of all, in these cases the *tad uktam* pre-quote is not systematically present anymore. There is a substantial amount of uncredited quotations from the NBh, which is all in prose, except for rare passages (see Table 10.3). Perhaps these passages were so well known to Jayanta and his audience to make irrelevant the necessity of credits, or perhaps in Jayanta's understanding only versified passages were worthy of credits, but in some cases they could also be unconscious re-uses creeping in the NM.[14] In the context of versification, I found (48) particularly interesting, where a prose passage of the NBh is integrated and completed in metrical form by Jayanta.

In relation to re-use in Nyāya literature, in any case, it seems that the impact of the oral tradition, and thus of massive portions of works committed to memory, must be taken into account.

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C Ms. 2606, Malayalam Department of the University of Calicut, Thenjipalam (Malappuram District). Undated; foll. 188; cm. 5 × 48 ca.; palm-leaf; Malayālam. Contains the complete NM 1–6 and about one third of NM 7. In the original foliation, the first leaf is foliated as śrī, and is followed by foll. 1–187 in letter numerals.

[14] For a parallel case in Mīmāṃsā, see Freschi's contribution in this volume.

GBh Nagin J. Shah, ed. (1972). *Cakradhara's Nyāyamañjarī-granthibhaṅga*. Lalbhai Dalpatbhai series, 35. Ahmedabad: L.D. Institute of Indology.

NBh Anantalal Thakur, ed. (1997b). *Gautamīyanyāyadarśana with Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana.* Nyāyacaturgranthikā 1. For the first chapter, it is the revised edition of the same author's edition of the Nyāyacaturgranthika, Adhyāya 1. Mithila Institute Series Ancient Text 20. Darbhanga 1967. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research.

NM^{Ga} Mahamahopadhyaya Gangadhara Shastri Tailanga, ed. (1895). *The Nyāyamañjarī of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa*. Vizianagram Sanskrit Series 8. Benares: E.J. Lazarus and Co.

NM^{Va} K.S. Varadācārya, ed. (1969–1983). *Nyāyamañjarī: with Ṭippaṇī Nyāyasaurabha.* Two volumes. Mysore: Oriental Research Institute.

NS see NBh.

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PSṬ Ernst Steinkellner, Helmut Krasser, and Horst Lasic, eds. (2005). *Jinendrabuddhi's Viśalāmalavatī Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā*. Beijing–Vienna: Austrian Academy of Sciences Press.

ŚBh Kashinath Vasudev Abhyankar and Ganesh Shastri Ambadas Joshi, eds. (1970–1974). *Mīmāṃsādarśana*. Ānandāśramasaṃskṛtagranthāvāli 97. Vol. 1: MS 1.1, with Śābarabhāṣya and Prabhābhidhā commentary by Vaidyanath Shastri. Vol. 2: MS 1.2–2.1, with Śābarabhāṣya and Tantravārttika. Vol. 3: MS 2.2–2.4, with Śābarabhāṣya and Tantravārttika. Vol. 4: MS 3.1–3.8, with Śābarabhāṣya and Tantravārttika. Vol. 5: MS 4.1–7.4, with Śābarabhāṣya and Ṭupṭīkā. Vol. 6: MS 8.1–10.8, with Śābarabhāṣya and Ṭupṭīkā. Vol. 7: MS 11.1–12.4, with Śābarabhāṣya and Ṭupṭīkā. Or. ed. 1930–1933. Pune: Anandashrama.

ŚV^{Dvā} Śāstrī Dvārikādāsa, ed. (1978). *Ślokavārttika of Śrī Kumārila Bhaṭṭa with the Commentary Nyāyaratnākara of Śrī Pārthasārathi Miśra*. Prāchyabhārati Series 10. Varanasi.

ŚV^{Ra} S.K. Ramanatha Sastri, ed. (1971). *Ślokavārtikavyākhyā Tātparyaṭīkā of Umveka Bhaṭṭa*. Revised by K. Kunjunni Raja and R. Thangaswamy. Or. Ed. 1940. University of Madras, p. 672.

ŚVTṬ see ŚV^{Ra}.

SphS Madeleine Biardeau, ed. (1958). *La demonstration du sphoṭa par Maṇḍana Miśra. Introduction, traduction et commentaire*. Pondichéry: Institut français d'Indologie.

TB V.A. Ramaswami Sastri, ed. (1936). *Tattvabindu by Vācaspatimiśra with Tattvavibhāvanā by Ṛṣiputra Parameśvara*. Madras: Annamalai University.

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